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Abstract
We develop a simple model of collective experimentation and take it to the lab. In
equilibrium, as in the recent work of Strulovici (2010), majority rule has a bias toward
under experimentation, as good news for a minority of voters may lead a majority of
voters to abandon a policy when each of them thinks it is likely that the policy will be
passed by a future majority excluding them. We compare the behavior in the lab of
groups under majority rule and under the optimal voting rule, which precludes voting
in intermediate stages of the policy experiment. Surprisingly, simple majority performs
better than the (theoretically) optimal voting rule. Majority rule seems to be more
robust than other forms of voting when players make mistakes.
1 Introduction
Groups and societies often face decisions whose consequences for different individuals are
uncertain and can only be learn over time. As an illustration, trade reforms, changes in
immigration or environmental policies, big overhauls of the public health or the tax system,
etc. often have consequences that are heterogenous and hard to forecast for different indi-
viduals. Policy innovation in those circumstances is akin to an experiment conducted by the
society which may result in the new policies being entrenched or abandon as new evidence
mounts up. Such experiments open a new dimension to the collective choice problem, since
majority preferences in favor or against the new policies may change over time. In order
for the society to make decisions, it is necessary to specify not only a voting rule but also
how this rule is going to change over time. In this paper, we develop a simple model of the
dynamic collective experimentation problem. We use lab evidence to explore the efficiency
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implications of different dynamic voting rules from a utilitarian perspective, and to compare
game theoretic predictions with the behavior of subjects in the lab.
In the model, group members must decide whether to adopt or not a policy. It is unclear
ex ante who will benefit and who will lose from the policy. Individuals may learn that
they will win from the reform in two subsequent stages, after which they have to decide
whether to stick to the policy for good or abandon it. As in Strulovici’s (2010) influential
contribution, the policy may be derailed in an intermediate stage if a minority learns that
they will be winners, as voters in the remainder may anticipate the policy could be adopted
in the final stage even if they emerge individually as losers. In the context of the model,
the optimal voting rule specifies unanimity at intermediate stages and simple majority in
the final stage. The lab implementation reveals, surprisingly, that adopting simple majority
throughout yields more efficient outcomes than the (game theoretic) optimal voting rule.
The reason is that simple majority is more robust to individual voters making mistakes in
a dynamic sense: the majority at the intermediate stage may derail policies that could be
adopted later on for good by a different majority by mistake. We also investigate whether
the bias toward overoptimism may be due to persistent versus temporary overoptimism, and
present evidence consistent with the latter.
The efficiency advantages of unanimity versus simple majority is, of course, a classi-
cal theme in political economy, at least since the publication of the Calculus of Consent
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). To the traditional trade-off, predicated in a static setting,
our work adds a dynamic dimension. Evidence from the lab indicates that repeated major-
ity voting is self-correcting in a way that is not captured by equilibrium analysis. In our
setting, majority voting at an intermediate stage allows to overcome an overoptimism bias.
Subjects’ voting behavior is consistent with them overestimating their probability of success
after failing to receive high signals.
There is by now a growing theoretical literature on collective experimentation problems.
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) provide the seminal contribution, showing that a policy may
have minority support ex ante even if it will have majority support ex post for sure if indi-
vidual voters are afraid of ending up in the losing minority. The above-mentioned article by
Strolovici models collective experimentation as a continuous time game with a continuum
of voters, identifies the deviations from efficiency implied by adopting majority voting at
every moment and derives the (time contingent) optimal voting rule. Our model recovers
the strategic elements of Strulovici’s (2010) model in a discrete time setting with few voters
in a way that can be taken to the lab. This allows to check whether the strategic incen-
tives identified by the literature operate in a controlled setting, and explore deviations from
equilibrium predictions and their consequences.
Other recent theoretical work on collective experimentation has focused on collective
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search by committees, as in the work of Albrech et al. (2010) and Moldovanu and Shi (2013),
on optimal voting rules for two period models, as in the work of Messner and Polborn
(2012), on incentives to over-experiment for preemptive reasons when the policymaker may
not remain in power, as in Callander and Hummel (2014), on dynamic sequential acquisition
by committees, as in Chan et al. (2015), and on extending Strolovici’s model to consider bad
signals, as in Khromenkova (2017). In spite of the growing interest and relevance of this line
of work, we are not aware of other lab research on dynamic collective experimentation.
The remainder of this paper organized as follows. Section 2 presents the simple collective
experimentation model we use and provides theoretical predictions. Section 3 provides details
about the experimental design. Section 4 presents results obtained from the experiment.
Section 5 gathers final remarks. All omitted proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Theoretical framework
We consider a simple three period voting game with three players in which players choose
between a safe and a risky project. Players can be of two types: high or low, depending on
whether the player receives a high (h) or a low (l) payoff if the risky project is implemented.
All players receive a payoff of s if the safe project is implemented, independently of type,
where h > s > l.
In the first period, players vote on whether to start experimenting or not. If they start
experimenting, each player receives a public signal. The signal can be high or uncertain.
If the player receives the high signal, then the player’s payoff from implementing the risky
project is h. If the signal is uncertain, the player does not know which payoff the player
would receive in case of implementing the risky project. If the player is of high type, then
there is a probability q ∈ (0, 1) that the player will receive the high signal, while if the player
is of low type, there is a probability of zero that the player will receive a high signal.
In the second period, after observing the public signals received by all players, players
vote on whether to continue experimenting. If they continue, they receive signals again. For
notational simplicity, since their type has been already disclosed, we assume that players
who received high signals in period 1 receive them again in period 2. For the reminder of
players, as in the previous period, then there is a probability q ∈ (0, 1) that the player will
receive the high signal, while if the player is of low type, there is a probability of zero that
the player will receive a high signal. We denote by wt ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} the total number of
“High” signals received in period t ∈ {1, 2}, with w2 ≥ w1 ≥ 0.
Finally, in the third period, players vote on whether to implement the risky project or
the safe project. If the risky project is implemented, all voters’ types are disclosed; in either
case, all payoffs are realized.
3
Denote by p0 the initial probability that the player is of a high type. Using Bayes’ Law,
the probability that a player is of high type after receiving an uncertain signal in period 1 is
p1 =
p0(1− q)
1− p0q ,
and the probability that a player is of high type after receiving uncertain signals in periods
1 and 2 is
p2 =
p1(1− q)
1− p1q =
p0(1− q)2
1− 2p0q + p0q2 .
We denote by
r = p2h+ (1− p2)l
the expected payoff from the risky project for a player that received uncertain signals in
periods 1 and 2. We assume r < s, so that a player that does not receive high signals would
prefer to adopt the safe project.
Note that a utilitarian social planner would experiment in periods 1 and 2, and would
adopt the project in the third period if w2h+(1−w2)r > 3s, and only if w2h+(1−w2)r ≥ 3s.
We investigate the behavior of agents in the model under majority voting. We also
describe an optimal voting rule, i.e. a voting rule that implements the utilitarian social
planner’s choices. Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in undominated
strategies. As customary in voting games, we eliminate weakly dominated strategies to
avoid trivial equilibria in which no player is decisive. For notational simplicity, we assume
that players vote to continue experimenting when indifferent.
2.1 Majority voting and under experimentation
In this section, we provide conditions under which, in equilibrium, majority voting deviates
from the utilitarian social planner’s choices by stopping the policy after a minority gets good
news in period 1, but otherwise coincides with the social planner choices (see Figure 1).
Parameter values satisfying these restrictions allow us to test whether majority voting leads
to under experimentation as in Strulovici (2010).
We proceed by backward induction, from the last stage to the first. Since by assumption
h > s > r, in the third period only players who have obtained a high signal vote to implement
the policy, so the policy is implemented if w2 ≥ 2. The condition in Lemma 1 below implies
that utilitarian social planner adopt the same decision than majority voting:
Lemma 1. The utilitarian social planner and majority voting outcomes coincide in the third
period if and only if
1
2
<
h− s
s− r < 2.
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In the second period, if w1 ≥ 2, then the policy is continued. If w1 = 1, the two players
who have not received a high signal will vote to terminate the policy if each of them perceives
that there is a high enough probability that the other one will be eventually a winner and
they will be the only losers:
Lemma 2. If w1 = 1, voters will abandon the policy in the second period if and only if
h− s
s− r < 1− p1q.
Note that, along the lines of Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), the policy is stopped in the
second period even if it is likely to be supported by a majority in the third and final period.
Also in the second period, if w1 = 0, all players will vote to continue the policy as long
as there is a high enough probability of being winners in the end:
Lemma 3. If w1 = 0, voters will continue the policy in the second period if and only if
h− s
s− r ≥
1− p1q
2− p1q .
As in Strulovici (2010), the threshold for the policy to pass after w1 = 1 is more demand-
ing than the threshold for the policy to pass after w1 = 0. That is, continuation of the policy
experiment is not necessarily monotonic in the number of supportive signals obtained in an
intermediate stage.
Finally, turning to the first period, all players support starting experimentation if the
expected payoff is larger than or equal to the payoff of the safe project:
Lemma 4. If
1− p1q
2− p1q ≤
h− s
s− r < 1− p1q,
voters will start experimenting with the policy in the first period.
Intuitively, the condition for players to experiment with the policy after getting uncertain
signals, laid out in Lemma 3, is more stringent than the condition for players to be willing
to experiment with the policy before getting signals.
2.2 Optimal voting rule
In this section, we show that a voting rule that requires simple majority to start the project
in the first period and to adopt if for good in the third period, but specifies no voting in the
second period (or requires unanimity to abandon the policy in the second period) implements
the utilitarian social planner outcomes, as long as the conditions of Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 are
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Figure 2: Collective Decision Tree for Time-Varying Quorum Rule Mechanism
satisfied. Note that the upper bound for (h − s)/(r − s) in Lemma 2 is more demanding
than the upper bound in Lemma 1, but the lower bound in Lemma 1 is more demanding
than the lower bound in Lemma 3.
Figure 2 illustrates the collective decision tree for the putative optimal voting rule. In-
tuitively, this rule precludes players to stop the policy if only one high signal was received
in the first period.
Lemma 5. Suppose
1
2
≤ h− s
s− r < 1− p1q.
Then, the voting rule that requires simple majority to start the project in the first period
and to adopt if for good in the third period, but specifies no voting in the second period,
implements the utilitarian social planner outcomes.
3 Experimental design
We conduct a lab experiment based on the theoretical model with the following parameter
values (see Table 1). Parameters were chosen in order to satisfy the conditions stated in
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Lemmas 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, equilibrium behavior predicts that simple majority would be
suboptimal, while the optimal voting rule delivers outcomes that coincide with the utilitarian
planner choices.
Parameter Value
Probability of being high type p0 1/2
Probability that signal reveals the type q 1/2
High payoff h 500
Low payoff l 50
Safe payoff s 350
Exchange rate 20 tokens per US dollar
Table 1: Parameters specification
The experimental design consists of two treatments. In the first treatment, subjects
make decisions under simple majority and in the second one under the optimal voting rule.
We refer to them as majority treatment and optimal treatment. The game was played 15
rounds with random reshuﬄing of the groups, to ensure that the were no repetitions with
the same group composition. The experiment was coded and conducted using oTree (Chen
et al., 2016). Experimental instructions can be found in the appendix. We conducted the
experiment with 60 undergraduate students from George Mason University. There were 36
subjects in the majority treatment and 24 in in the optimal treatment. Subjects’ earnings
varied between $10 and $40.
4 Experimental results
We start by looking at group level results to test theoretical predictions and compare the
performance of the two voting rules. Then we move on to analyzing individual behavior to
explore possible biases which caused the observed group level behavior. Finally, we present
results from the structural estimates of the Quantal Response Equilibrium model (introduced
by McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998).
4.1 Group level analysis
Figure 3 summarizes the results. Red numbers correspond to the frequencies of action in the
majority treatment and blue numbers correspond to the frequencies in the optimal treatment.
Green lines correspond to optimal (utilitarian planner) choices. A first observation is that
subjects (in both treatments) start the project with very high probability which is in line
with theoretical predictions.
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Figure 3: Probabilities of abandoning and implementing the policy on the collective decision
tree. Red and Blue numbers correspond, respectively, to the frequencies obtained in the
majority treatment and in the optimal treatment. Green lines correspond to the socially
optimal decisions at every node. Stopping frequencies and frequencies of policy implemen-
tations displayed are conditional on the probability of reaching the node. In square brackets
we show probabilities of implementing the policy conditional only on the history of signals
received.
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(w1, w2) Probability
Observed frequency Equilibrium earnings Observed earnings
Majority Optimal Mayority Optimal Mayority Optimal
(0,0) .244 .220 .300 0 0 −16.15 −122.5
(0,1) .147 .100 .160 0 0 −60 −99.47
(0,2) .029 .011 .025 90 90 90 90
(0,3) .002 .006 .000 450 450 0 ∅
(1,1) .293 .310 .190 0 0 −67.5 105.65
(1,2) .117 .100 .180 0 90 63 81.43
(1,3) .012 .011 .000 0 450 0 ∅
(2,2) .117 .156 .130 90 90 77.14 90
(2,3) .030 .060 .008 450 450 368.18 450
(3,3) .016 .017 .008 450 450 300 450
Expected 34.74 50.67 2.31 −32.10
Table 2: Normalized expected revenue
Recall that the theoretical deviation of majority voting from optimal utilitarian behavior
happens at t = 2 if one high signal is received. Equilibrium predicts that the policy will be
abandoned in this case, while optimality requires to continue the policy. In the experiment,
policy is abandoned with a frequency of 26%, which is significantly lower than equilibrium
would predict (with p < .001). At the same time, the observed frequency of stopping is
significantly higher than what would be optimal. Moreover, there is also significant under-
experimentation in the case of no high signals received. If two or more high signals were
received, the policy was terminated with a frequency of 13% . This under-experimentation
is not robustly significant (p = .02 according t-test and p = .06 for Wilcoxon test).
Numbers in square brackets at the final leafs of the game tree in Figure 3 show the
frequency of policy implementation for the different possible trajectories of high signals
received. We can see that the optimal voting rule implements significantly (p < .01) more
frequently the policy when it is efficient to do so (w2 ≥ 2) is implemented. However, we
also see that the optimal voting rule implements significantly (p < .05) more frequently the
policy when it is inefficient to do so (w2 < 2). Moreover, neither of the two treatment effects
is eliminated with learning.
Note that significant over-experimentation is not caused by subjects using different strate-
gies in different treatments at t = 3. Numbers below the leaves, corresponding to stopping
the policy in t = 3, show the frequency of abandoning the policy in the last period condition-
ing on continuing the project at t = 2. There are not significant differences over treatments
in these frequencies. Subjects use similar strategies in the last period (at least on the group
level); the forced continuation of the policy caused by the (theoretically) optimal voting rule
leads to an over-implementation of policy.
Table 2 presents revenue outcomes for the two treatments. The first column lists all
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possible signal histories for a group. The second one shows the theoretical probabilities with
which the history appears. The third and fourth columns show the observed frequencies for
every history by treatment. Note that there are deviations from theoretical probabilities in
both treatments, and there are differences in frequencies between treatments. For compar-
ison purposes, we use theoretical probabilities instead of observed frequencies to compute
expected earnings for every treatment. The fifth and sixth columns show earning outcomes
for the group for every history derived from theoretical equilibrium behavior. The last two
columns show the averaged observed earning outcomes for every history. (The symbol ∅
denotes histories for which there is no observations and correspond to the zero observed
frequency events.). Revenue data is normalized by subtracting 1050 = 350× 3 (revenue for
the group from the safe project). Hence, numbers in the last two columns indicate net gains
or loses from implementing the policy instead of the safe payoff.
Expected observed revenue is higher in the majority rule treatment. This is caused
by significant over-experimentation in the optimal voting rule treatment. We conduct a
two-step bootstrapping procedure (see Appendix B for details) that confirms the statistical
significance of the differences in expected net earnings presented in Table 2. Expected group
revenue under the optimal voting rule is in fact negative–the group is doing worse than
always staying with the safe payoff. This is a consequence of both over implementation and
the fact that with our parameter specification most probability weight lies in the domain
where behavior under the optimal voting rule leads to inefficient outcomes.
4.2 Individual level analysis
In the section we turn to the analysis of observed individual behavior. In particular, we
investigate possible behavioral biases causing observed group level results.
Recall that the equilibrium action in both treatments in the first period is to vote to
start the policy, and in the third period it is to vote to implement the policy for good in the
third period if a player has obtained a high signal, and against implementing the policy if
the player has not obtained a high signal. In the second period, in the majority treatment,
under our parameter specification, the equilibrium action is to vote to continue the policy if
a player has obtained a high signal or if no one else has obtained a high signal, and to vote
to abandon the policy otherwise.
Figure 4 shows the probability of playing equilibrium actions. The first (blue) and the
second (red) bars show, respectively, the probability of playing an equilibrium action in the
optimal rule and in the majority rule treatments, aggregating over the first and third period
in the optimal voting rule treatment, and over all three periods in the majority treatment.
The third and fourth bars show the probability of playing an equilibrium action in the second
an third periods in the majority treatment.
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Figure 4: Frequency of playing equilibrium actions
The probability of playing equilibrium actions in the majority treatment is significantly
lower than in the optimal treatment; as illustrated by Figure 4, this is due to the behavior
of players in the second period. This behavior is not necessarily bad in terms of expected
earnings. The reason is that equilibrium actions are (unique) undominated best responses
in the third period, but they are not necessarily undominated best responses in the first and
second period taking into account the actual behavior of players in subsequent periods. For
instance, in the optimal voting treatment, given (negative) expected earnings, the undomi-
nated best response action in the first period would be to vote against experimenting with
the policy. In the majority treatment, the undominated best response coincides with the
equilibrium action in the first and third period, but does not coincide with the equilibrium
action in the second period. In particular, given the observed frequencies in Figure 3, the
best response action in the second period is to vote to abandon the project if w1 = 0. In
the majority treatment, deviations from equilibrium behavior in the second period help to
counter deviations from best response behavior in the final period.
We investigate now whether subjects learn to play equilibrium strategies. Figure 5 shows
the probability of playing equilibrium actions by round. Figure 5(a) presents the results for
the two treatments. The probability of playing equilibrium actions in the optimal treatment
is higher than in the majority treatment in most periods, though there is no single period in
which the difference is significant. Figure 5(b) presents the results for the majority treatment
decomposed by period. Comparing the behavior in the second and third periods we observe
that overall the probability of playing equilibrium actions is higher at t = 3. Moreover, there
is a significant increase in the probability of equilibrium actions in the third period under
majority treatment (p < .05), but no significant increase in the second period. Since equi-
librium actions are unique undominated best responses in the third period, there is evidence
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Figure 5: Frequency of playing equilibrium actions over time
of learning. The situation in the second period is more involved; if learning equilibrium
actions in the third period were closer to completely successful, it would make sense to play
equilibrium actions in the third period.
Figure 6(a) shows the frequency of voting for the policy conditional on the signal received
for both treatments. Note that voting for the policy after a high signal is the unique undom-
inated best response. There is no difference in voting for the policy in this case. Note also
that voting for the policy after uncertain signals in the third period reduces the expected
earnings of the player; it can be attributed to overoptimistic expectations regarding the rev-
enue of the project for the player. For the optimal treatment, in particular, the frequency of
voting for the policy (around 25%) is evidence in favor of a bias for overoptimism. For the
majority treatment the situation is more involved; voting for the project in the third period
is evidence in support of overoptimism, but voting for the project in the second period may
or may not be a best response.
We investigate now whether overoptimistic behavior is persistent feature along the repe-
titions of the game. Figure 7 shows the frequency of voting for the policy after receiving an
uncertain signal by round. Figure 7(a) shows the frequency for different treatments. This
frequency declines over time for the optimal treatment, which is consistent with learning
best responses (marginally significant at p = .07). It remains relatively high for the majority
treatment, where it may reflect the fact that voting for the policy in the second period after
an uncertain signal may be a best response (and in fact it is the equilibrium action if no one
else obtains high signals).
Figure 7(b) shows the frequency of voting for the policy after an uncertain signal for t = 2
and t = 3 in the majority treatment over different rounds. The frequency is systematically
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Figure 6: Frequency of voting for the project given the signal received
higher for the second period. This frequency declines over time for the third period, which
again is consistent with learning best responses (marginally significant at p = .08.)
Next we investigate in the majority treatment whether players who receive uncertain
signals in both periods vote for the policy in both periods as well. This may be evidence
that these players are in fact overoptimistic.
All Males Females
t = 2 and t = 3 .1722 .1369 .2347
Only t = 3 .2125 .1738 .2808
Only t = 2 .5549 .6155 .4476
Table 3: Average frequency of voting for the policy when receiving uncertain signals in both
periods
Table 3 presents the average frequencies for all sample and split by gender. A first obser-
vation is that there are no (statistically significant) gender differences in behavior patterns,
against the common occurrence of gender differences in overoptimistic behavior. A second
observation is that many players vote for the policy after two bad signals but not after one
signal, so that overoptimism as a persistent trait cannot explain all the behavioral patterns.
4.3 A structural model
We estimate a simple Quantal Response Equilibrium model with behavioral types, similar to
Elbittar et al. (forthcoming). The model has two parameters (Q, p) Q is a quantal response
parameter while p is a type parameter. With probability 1 − Q, each player uniformly
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Figure 7: Frequency of voting for the project if uncertain signal is received over time
randomly choses one of two actions (voting for or against the policy). With probability p, a
player who is not choosing randomly votes for the project no matter what. We interpret p
as the probability of being (temporarily) overoptimistic.
Figure 8 illustrates the structural model. The probability that player i in period t votes
for the policy (vit = 1) is
P (vit = 1|sit, wt, p, Q) = Q((1− p)vˆit(sit, wt, p, Q) + p) +
1−Q
2
,
where sit is the player’s signal, wt is the number of high signals received in the period, p,Q
are the QRE parameters, and vˆit(s
i
t, wt, p, Q) is the undominated best-response given the
player’s signal, taking the value of one if it is a best-response to vote for the project and
zero otherwise. Best-response depends on the model parameters, since QRE assumes that
each player not only deviates from best-response behavior with some probability, but also
takes into account that other subjects do so while deciding what is the best-response. The
probability that player i in period t votes against the policy (vit = 0) is, in turn,
P (vit = 0|sit, wt, p, Q) = Q(1− p)(1− vˆit(sit, wt, p, Q)) +
1−Q
2
.
Denote by nvt for v ∈ {0, 1} and t ∈ {1, 2, 3} the number of subjects who took decision v
in period t. We can derive the following likelihood function for the majority treatment:
L(Q, p, n) =
∏
t∈{1,2,3}
{(
Q((1− p)vˆit + p) +
1−Q
2
)n1t (
Q(1− p)(1− vˆit) +
1−Q
2
)n0t}
.
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Figure 8: Structural model
For the optimal treatment we do not consider t = 2, since there is no decision made, so we
take nv2 = 0 for v ∈ {0, 1}.
Q p
Majority treatment .76 .35
Majority treatment without t = 2 .77 .14
Optimal treatment .87 .11
Pooled data .78 .07
Table 4: Estimated parameters
Table 4 presents the results obtained from estimating the model based on majority treat-
ment, optimal treatment and pooled data (including both majority and optimal treatments).
Given the estimated parameters, best response in the second period is similar to best re-
sponse in the third period: a player should vote based on the player’s own signal, voting in
favor of the policy after a high signal and against the policy otherwise. Note that for all
estimated parameters the best response is to start a project in the first period. The bias in
favor of accepting the policy, beyond uniform random deviations, is small and comparable
in all cases, except for majority treatment when including t = 2. In that case, though,
best-response behavior actually conflicts with Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium behavior, so the
apparent overoptimistic bias may reflect strategic uncertainty.
Table 5 presents the probability of abandoning the policy given estimated parameters
for different values of wt. Since best responses in the second and third period are similar in
the estimated QRE model, there is no difference between the probability of abandoning the
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wt = 0 wt = 1 wt = 2 wt = 3
Majority treatment (Q = .76, p = .35) .67 .43 .14 .04
Majority without t = 2 (Q = .77, p = .14) .87 .64 .17 .04
Optimal treatment (Q = .87, p = .11) .93 .71 .11 .01
Pooled data (Q = .78, p = .07) .93 .73 .18 .03
Table 5: Probabilities of stopping the policy conditional on wt high signals
project in the second and third periods. The estimations are relatively close the observed
frequencies, except for majority treatment when including t = 2.
Finally, we attempt to classify subjects in persistent types, best-responder or overopti-
mistic, using likelihood ratios. For the majority treatment, every subject participated in 15
repetitions of the game and made at least once decision, so that for every subject we have
between 15 and 45 observations. Similarly, for the optimal treatment, we have between 15
and 30 decisions for every subject.
Persistent best responder and overoptimistic types have different likelihood functions, and
we compare the odds of them. For all estimated decision making errors the best response
is to start a project and to vote further according to the signal player received. Hence, if
we denote by kvt the amount of times then player voted v ∈ {0, 1} in period t, we can write
down the following likelihood ratio:
λ(Q, k) =
(
Q+ 1−Q
2
)k11 (1−Q
2
)k01 ∏
t∈{2,3}
{(
Qsit +
1−Q
2
)k1t (Q(1− sit) + 1−Q2 )k0t}∏
t∈{1,2,3}
{(
Q+ 1−Q
2
)k1t (1−Q
2
)k0t} .
The numerator corresponds to the likelihood that the player is a best-responder given Q,
while the denominator corresponds to the likelihood that the player is overoptimistic given
Q. If λ(Q, k) > 20 we classify a player as best responder, if λ(Q, k) < 1
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we classify player
as overoptimistic, otherwise the player is unclassified. One can interpret 20 : 1 odds, for
descriptive purposes, as indicating with 95% confidence that the subject is correctly classified
by the estimated model.
Majority Majority without t = 2 Optimal Pooled
best responders .50 .97 .79 .62
unclassified .28 .03 .21 .25
overoptimistic .22 .00 .00 .13
Table 6: Classification of subjects
Table 6 presents the fraction of subject classified by treatment and with pooled data. For
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every column we use the parameter Q estimated from the sample (see Table 4). Except for
majority treatment when including t = 2, subjects are either classified as best-responders or
left unclassified, with few exceptions. This is further evidence against persistent overopti-
mistic types.
Note that the observed over experimentation cannot be explained by risk aversion. The
more risk-averse players are, the more they would under experiment. We conclude that the
observed behavior may be due to over optimism, but not to persistent types.
5 Final remarks
We construct a simple three-period political economy model of experimentation. In the
model, after a policy is adopted, individual voters may obtain or not conclusive signals that
they will be winners from the policy. We show that majority rule may have a bias toward
under experimentation, capturing a strategic consequence of collective experimentation first
identified by Strulovici (2010), and describe an optimal voting rule. The optimal voting
rule either requires unanimity for abandoning the policy in intermediate stages, or simply
eschews voting in intermediate stages.
We implement the model in the lab with three-player groups. Against equilibrium pre-
dictions, we find over experimentation in the lab when there is little evidence in support of
adopting the policy under both majority voting and the (theoretically) optimal voting rule.
This causes majority voting to outperform the optimal voting rule: allowing voters to vote
at intermediate stages about the policy allows them to reduce the probability that the policy
is adopted for good by mistakes made in the final stage.
We interpret mistakes in favor of adopting the policy for good in the final stage as a
consequence of over optimism. We find very little evidence in support of persistent overopti-
mism for individual subjects in the lab implementation. Some of the results may reflect the
complexity of the strategic calculus for lab participants when best response behavior given
the actual behavior of other players conflict with equilibrium predictions. Also, the impact
of individual mistakes on group decision may be lower in larger groups. Finding ways to pro-
vide subjects with more feedback about the behavior of other subjects without stretching the
design beyond what is reasonable, and using larger groups, seem avenues worth exploring.
Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 1. The utilitarian social planner and majority voting outcomes coincide in the third
period if and only if
1
2
<
h− s
s− r < 2.
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Proof. Since by assumption r = p2h + (1− p2)l < s, only players who received high signals
would vote to adopt the policy in the last period. Therefore, under the majority rule the
outcome would be to implement the policy if there were at least two good signals and abandon
otherwise. The utilitarian social planner, instead, would make a decision based on the total
welfare amount. The total utility from abandoning the policy in favor of safe alternative is
3s, the payoff from implementing the risky alternative after two high signals is 2h + r, and
the payoff from implementing the project after receiving only one high signal is h+ 2r. The
condition in the lemma guarantees that the social planer’s actions to coincide with majority
voting.
Lemma 2. If w1 = 1, voters will abandon the policy in the second period if and only if
h− s
s− r < 1− p1q.
Proof. Suppose w1 = 1, and consider the players who did not receive a high signal. Their
expected payoff can be decomposed in the following three cases:
(i) The player receives a high signal in the next period. Then the player’s payoff is h
for sure, since there are at least two agents with high signals and the project will be
implemented.
(ii) The player does not receive a high signal but the other player does. Then the player’s
payoff is r since there are two players receiving high signals and the policy will be
implemented.
(iii) None of the two players receive high signals in the next period. Then, the player’s
payoff is s since the project will be abandoned.
The expected payoff from voting for continue experimenting is then:
Epi(Continue) = p1qh+ p1q(1− p1q)r + (1− p1q)2s.
The alternative is to abandon the project and receive the safe payoff. Hence, the net gain of
adopting the policy is
Epi(Continue)− s = p1q ((h− s) + (1− p1q)(r − s)) ,
which is negative if and only if (h− s)/(s− r) < 1− p1q. Hence, under the condition of the
lemma, the two players who did not receive the high signal prefer to abandon the policy in
the second period.
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Lemma 3. If w1 = 0, voters will continue the policy in the second period if and only if
h− s
s− r ≥
1− p1q
2− p1q .
Proof. Suppose w1 = 0 and consider any of the three players. If the policy continues, it will
be adopted in the final period in two cases:
(i) The player obtains a high signal and at least another player does. The probability of
this event is p1q(2p1q(1− p1q) + (p1q)2) = (p1q)2(2− p1q), and in this case the player
obtains a payoff of h.
(ii) The player does not obtain a high signal but the other two players do. The probability
of this event is (1− p1q)(p1q)2, and in this case the player obtains a payoff of r.
In the remainder event the policy is not adopted in the final period and the player obtains
a payoff of s. Hence, the net gain of adopting the policy is:
Epi(Continue)− s = (p1q)2 ((h− s)(2− p1q) + (r − s)(1− p1q)) ,
which is negative if and only if (h − s)/(s − r) < (1 − p1q)/(2 − p1q). Hence, the player
prefers to abandon the policy in the second period if and only if this inequality holds.
Lemma 4. If
1− p1q
2− p1q ≤
h− s
s− r < 1− p1q,
voters will start experimenting with the policy in the first period.
Proof. First, let us find the probability of receiving a high payoff for sure in the last period
if the reform is started. There are two possible cases: either the player receives a high signal
at t = 1 (which occurs with probability p0q) or the player does not receive a high signal
at t = 1 but receives a high signal at t = 2 (which occurs with probability (1 − p0q)p1q).
The following table summarizes the probabilities of implementing the policy conditional on
possible events in these two cases.
High signal received at t w1 w2 Probability
1 2 2 or 3 2p0q(1− p0q)
1 3 3 (p0q)
2
2 0 2 (1− p0q)22(p1q)(1− p1q)
2 0 3 (1− p0q)2(p1q)2
2 2 3 (p0q)
2
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In the table we use the fact that the project is stopped if there is only one high signal
received in the first period, as implied by Lemma 2.
Now, let us calculate the probability of receiving a payoff of r if the reform is started. In
this case player cannot receive a high signal, which happens with probability (1−p0q)(1−p1q).
Then, the project is implemented if either both other players receive high signals at t = 2
(which happens with probability (p0q)
2) or neither of them receive a high signal at t = 2
and both receive high signals at t = 3 (which happens with probability (1− p0q)2(p1q)2).
Then, the expected net gain of adopting the policy in the first period is:
Epi(Continue)− s = (h− s) [p0q (2p0q(1− p0q) + (p0q)2)
+ (1− p0q)p1q
(
(1− p0q)2(2(p1q)(1− p1q) + (p1q)2) + (p0q)2
)]
+(s− r)(1− p0q)(1− p1q)
[
(p0q)
2 + (1− p0q)2(p1q)2
]
.
Substituting and simplifying,
Epi(Continue)− s = (h− s)(p0q)2
[
2− p0q2 + (1− q)2(2− 3p0q + p0q2)
]
+(s− r)(p0q)2(1− 2p0q + p0q2)(1 + (1− q)2).
Thus, every player prefers to adopt the policy in the first period if
h− s
s− r ≥
(p0q)
2(1− 2p0q + p0q2)(1 + (1− q)2)
(p0q)2 [2− p0q2 + (1− q)2(2− 3p0q + p0q2)] , (1)
or equivalently
h− s
s− r ≥
(1− p0q)(1− p1q)(1 + (1− q)2)
1 + (1− p0q)[(1− q)2 + (1− p1q)(1 + (1− q)2)] .
We can rewrite this inequality as
1 +
1
1− p1q +
p0q
(1− p0q)(1− p1q)(1 + (1− q)2) ≥
s− r
h− s,
while we can rewrite the condition for Lemma 3 as
1 +
1
1− p1q ≥
s− r
h− s,
which is more demanding.
Lemma 5. Suppose
1
2
≤ h− s
s− r < 1− p1q.
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Then, the voting rule that requires simple majority to start the project in the first period
and to adopt if for good in the third period, but specifies no voting in the second period,
implements the utilitarian social planner outcomes.
Proof. Since the condition of Lemma 1 is satisfied, simple majority outcomes in the last
period coincide with the utilitarian outcomes. It remains to be shown that voters adopt the
policy under simple majority in the first period when they know that there will be no voting
until the final period.
The calculation is similar to the one in the proof of Lemma 4. To the events leading to
receiving a high payoff for sure in the last period, we have to add the events in which only
one high signal is received in the first period:
High signal received at t w1 w2 Probability
1 1 2 (1− p0q)22p1q(1− p1q)
1 1 3 (1− p0q)2(p1q)2
2 1 2 or 3 2p0q(1− p0q)
Thus, respect to the calculation in the proof of Lemma 4, equation 1, the probability of
receiving a payoff of h in rather than s in the third period increases in
p0q(1− p0q)2
(
2p1q(1− p1q) + (p1q)2
)
+ (1− p0q)p1q2p0q(1− p0q),
or equivalently,
p0q(1− p0q)2
(
2p1q(1− p1q) + (p1q)2 + 2p1q
) ≡ A.
Similarly, to the events leading to receiving a expected payoff of r in the last period, we have
to add the event in which only one high signal is received by other players in the first period,
with the other player receiving a high signal in the second period, which has probability
2(p0q)(1−p0q)p1q. Thus, respect to the calculation in the proof of Lemma 4, the probability
of receiving a payoff of r in rather than s in the third period increases in
(1− p0q)(1− p1q)2p0q(1− p0q)p1q,
or equivalently,
p0q(1− p0q)2(1− p1q)(2p1q) ≡ B.
Following the steps of the proof of Lemma 4, the condition for players to vote for adopting
the policy in the first period is then
h− s
s− r ≥
(p0q)
2(1− 2p0q + p0q2)(1 + (1− q)2) +B
(p0q)2 [2− p0q2 + (1− q)2(2− 3p0q + p0q2)] + A.
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It is easy to check that A > B, so if inequality 1 is satisfied, the condition above is satisfied
as well.
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Appendix B (for online publication only): Estimation
of expected earnings
We conduct a two-step procedure to estimate expected revenues. The algorithm selects
the history according to the theoretical distribution from Table 2. Then, it randomly picks
observations from the subsample of observed decisions given the history of the signals chosen.
Bootstrapped sample sizes correspond to the observed sample sizes. Further, the algorithm
calculates expected revenues (given the theoretical distribution), and allows us to create
the distribution of expected earnings for every treatment. We generate a sample of 10000
expected earnings using this technique. The results are based on these estimates.
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Figure 9: Expected Earnings
Figure 9 presents expected earnings obtained from the procedure explained above. Red
lines show the equilibrium level of earnings, as predicted by the theoretical model. We see
that both treatments lie significantly below the equilibrium earning levels. The bootstrapped
means are 1.31 (median is 1.49) for majority and −34.73 (median is −35.35) for the optimal
treatment. Moreover, the expected earnings from the optimal treatment are significantly
below those from the majority treatment (p < .001).
Appendix C (for online publication only): Experimental
instructions
We provide first the instructions for the majority treatment and next the instructions for
the optimal voting rule treatment.
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Instructions  
Welcome to our experiment! You have earned $5 by showing up on time. If you read and follow 
the instructions below carefully, you have the potential to earn up to $35. In the experiment you 
will earn Experimental Dollars (E$s) which will be converted into cash at the end of the 
experiment. For every 20 E$ you have at the end of the experiment you will be paid 1 US 
Dollar. You will NOT be told the names of those in your group and they will NOT be told your 
name. All participants have identical instructions. NO communication with other participants is 
allowed during this experiment. Please switch off your cell phones. If you have any questions 
please raise your hand, and the experimenter will assist you individually.  
 
Decision Task 
There are 15 rounds in this experiment. At the end of this experiment, only 1 round will be 
randomly selected to determine your final payment. Every round has equal chance of being 
chosen as the payoff round, therefore it is in your best interest to treat each round as if it is 
the one that determines your payment.  
 
At the beginning of each round, three players will compose a group, and each of you will get a 
Player ID (for example, Player 1, Player 2 or Player 3). The Player ID may vary from round to 
round. For each round, you will be randomly placed in a new group. 
There is one project at each round (different project at different round). You and the other two 
group members jointly decide whether or not to implement a project. If a project is implemented, 
each of you has 50% chance to receive a high payoff: E$500, and a 50% chance to receive a low 
payoff: E$50. Whether each of you receive a high payoff or low payoff is independently and 
randomly determined at the beginning of each round. If the project is NOT implemented, each of 
you will receive E$350 for sure. 
There are three stages for each round. At each stage, each of you will choose an action. The 
majority action of the group (i.e. at least two players) will be the action realized. 
At Stage 1, each of you can choose INITIATE or STOP the project right away. If the majority 
of you choose to STOP, the project is NOT implemented and this round ends. If the majority of 
you choose to INITIATE the project, each of you will get a signal regarding whether you can 
receive high payoff if the project is implemented.  The signal works in the following way:	
The signal is programmed to be either “High payoff for sure” or “Uncertain.” If you are a 
player who will receive high payoff if the project is implemented, there is 50% chance for you 
to receive a signal that says “High payoff for sure”, and another 50% to receive a signal 
that says “Uncertain”. If you are a player who will receive the low payoff if the project is 
implemented, you will always receive a signal that says “Uncertain.” In other words, if you 
get a “High payoff for sure” signal, you will keep receiving the same signal in the following 
stage (if any) of the same round, and you know that this round you will receive a high payoff for 
sure if the project is implemented. If you receive a signal that says “Uncertain”, it’s not clear 
whether you will receive high or low payoff if the project is implemented. Your signal only 
reveals your own chance of receiving high or low payoff from this project. Your group members 
receive different signals regarding their chance. All the signals are public information, that is, 
they will be observed by all group members.  
At Stage 2, you can choose to CONTINUE the project or STOP. If the majority of you choose 
to STOP, the project is NOT implemented and the round ends. If the majority of you choose to 
CONTINUE the project, each of you will get another signal about whether you are a high payoff 
player. The signal works exactly the same way as we explained above.   
At Stage 3, you can choose to IMPLEMENT the project or STOP. If the majority of you 
choose to STOP, the project is NOT implemented and this round ends. Otherwise, the project 
will be implemented. Each group member’s payoff will be revealed at the end of the round.  
The following graph summarizes the possible decisions and outcomes at each stage. Please raise 
your hand if you have any questions.  
 
Thank You and Good Luck! 
Instructions  
Welcome to our experiment! You have earned $5 by showing up on time. If you read and follow 
the instructions below carefully, you have the potential to earn up to $35. In the experiment you 
will earn Experimental Dollars (E$s) which will be converted into cash at the end of the 
experiment. For every 20 E$ you have at the end of the experiment you will be paid 1 US 
Dollar. You will NOT be told the names of those in your group and they will NOT be told your 
name. All participants have identical instructions. NO communication with other participants is 
allowed during this experiment. Please switch off your cell phones. If you have any questions 
please raise your hand, and the experimenter will assist you.  
 
Decision Task 
There are 30 rounds in this experiment. At the end of this experiment, only 1 round will be 
randomly selected to determine your final payment. Every round has equal chance of being 
chosen as the payoff round, therefore it is in your best interest to treat each round as if it is 
the one that determines your payment.  
 
At the beginning of each round, three players will compose a group, and each of you will get a 
Player ID (for example, Player 1, Player 2 or Player 3). The Player ID may vary from round to 
round. For each round, you will be randomly placed in a new group. 
There is one project at each round (different project at different round). You and the other two 
group members jointly decide whether or not to implement a project. If a project is implemented, 
each of you has 50% chance to receive a high payoff: E$500, and a 50% chance to receive a low 
payoff: E$50. Whether each of you receive a high payoff or low payoff is independently and 
randomly determined at the beginning of each round. If the project is NOT implemented, each of 
you will receive E$350 for sure. 
There are three stages for each round. At each stage, each of you will choose an action. The 
majority action of the group (i.e. at least two players) will be the action realized. 
At Stage 1, each of you can choose INITIATE or STOP the project right away. If the majority 
of you choose to STOP, the project is NOT implemented and this round ends. If the majority of 
you choose to INITIATE the project, each of you will get a signal regarding whether you can 
receive high payoff if the project is implemented.  The signal works in the following way:	
The signal is programmed to be either “High payoff for sure” or “Uncertain.” If you are a 
player who will receive high payoff if the project is implemented, there is 50% chance for you 
to receive a signal that says “High payoff for sure”, and another 50% to receive a signal 
that says “Uncertain”. If you are a player who will receive the low payoff if the project is 
implemented, you will always receive a signal that says “Uncertain.” In other words, if you 
get a “High payoff for sure” signal, you will keep receiving the same signal in the following 
stage (if any) of the same round, and you know that this round you will receive a high payoff for 
sure if the project is implemented. If you receive a signal that says “Uncertain”, it’s not clear 
whether you will receive high or low payoff if the project is implemented. Your signal only 
reveals your own chance of receiving high or low payoff from this project. Your group members 
receive different signals regarding their chance. All the signals are public information, that is, 
they will be observed by all group members.  
At Stage 2, the project continues. Each of you will get another signal about whether you are a 
high payoff player. The signal works exactly the same way as Stage 1.   
At Stage 3, you can choose to IMPLEMENT the project or STOP. If the majority of you 
choose to STOP, the project is NOT implemented and this round ends. Otherwise, the project 
will be implemented. Each group member’s payoff will be revealed at the end of the round.  
The following graph summarizes the possible decisions and outcomes at each stage. Please raise 
your hand if you have any questions.  
 
Thank You and Good Luck! 
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